One of the main difficulties in every discussion concerning barbarism seems to be what Reinhart Koselleck has called the "asymmetrical" structure of the relation between the concept of barbarism and its antithesis (211-59). Barbarism, in its current significance, is supposed to represent the opposite of culture or civilization, but the term barbarism could only have been coined and can only be used in a cultural context as well as in the name of culture; otherwise it seems to have no meaning at all. This has two important and interrelated consequences. Firstly, one can only speak of barbarism if one thinks of oneself as belonging to a culture. The very use of the term determines and indicates the side one necessarily speaks from. Secondly, it seems to be logically impossible to use the concept of barbarism with a selfdescriptive purpose. And-most importantly-it would be out of place to accuse somebody of barbarism, without being aware of the communicative futility of such an accusation. The reason is that if the accused person were a real barbarian, there would be no hope for him to accept or even to understand the accusation, as his barbarism makes him unable to apply the concept to himself. By calling someone a barbarian, we declare our resignation from the task of meaningful communication. But if we do this, then we have to admit that we have ceased to act as exponents of culture. Surprisingly, in our effort to distinguish our position from barbarism, we have abandoned the goal of comprehensibility and have become a kind of barbarians ourselves. But, as we have already seen, no barbarian can become conscious of his barbarism, which means that no culture is legitimized to represent itself as free from its opposite. In this sense, we are obliged to admit that culture is, and is condemned to be, contaminated with barbarism. In that case, if we do not want to drop the Barbarians and Their Cult:
On Walter Benjamin's Concept of New Barbarism Georgios Sagriotis distinction as well as the term altogether, we have to search for ways to handle the emerging paradox.
Indeed, the history of the concept is full of such paradoxes. This is especially true of the German philosophical tradition, to which Walter Benjamin also belongs.
Although there have been various attempts to cope with these paradoxes, I will try to simplify matters, by presenting two main lines in the German theory of culture. The first line, initiated perhaps by Friedrich Schiller, could be called the dialectical one. 
